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Abstract
Tax competition for a mobile factor is di®erent in `new economic geography set-
tings' compared to standard tax competition models. The agglomeration rent which
accrues to the mobile factor in the core region can be taxed. Moreover, a tax dif-
ferential between the core and the periphery can be maintained. The present paper
reexamines this issue in a setting which, in addition to the core-periphery equilibria,
exhibits stable equilibria with partial agglomeration. We show that a tax di®erential
may arise as an equilibrium of the tax game even when there is only partial agglom-
eration and the mobile factor does not derive an agglomeration rent.
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A remarkable insight uncovered in a recent literature holds that the nature of tax compe-
tition for a mobile factor, call it capital or entrepreneurs, is di®erent in a new economic
geography framework from what the standard tax competition model { a model which
is grounded on the assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition {
predicts. The standard model shows that the desire to attract the mobile factor leads
non-cooperatively acting governments to choose wastefully low levels of taxes and public
expenditures.1 Things are di®erent in the models of the new economic geography { e.g.
the so-called `core-periphery (CP) model' { which show how the interactions among trade
costs, increasing returns at the ¯rm level, and supply and demand linkages shape and
change the location of economic activity.2 These models, in contrast to traditional models,
are `lumpy' by their very nature. If trade costs are low enough, there are stable equilibria
where the mobile factor `lumps' together in one of the two regions and where an `agglomer-
ation rent' accrues to the mobile factor. Agglomeration forces turn the mobile factor into
a quasi-¯xed one, and so this agglomeration rent can be taxed by the local government
and a tax gap can be maintained between the core region and the periphery.3 Moreover,
since this agglomeration rent is a bell-shaped function of the level of trade integration, the
tax gap is also bell-shaped. Hence, in contrast to standard international tax-competition
results, closer integration may ¯rst result in a `race to the top' before leading to a `race to
the bottom' (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004).
The contribution of the present paper is to push the analysis of tax competition with
agglomeration a step further by considering the tax game in a model which also allows for
stable locational equilibria with only partial agglomeration of ¯rms in one of two countries.
Such equilibria have been shown to emerge under a variety of circumstances but do not exist
in the standard core-periphery model (see the discussion below). In the CP model, stable
1This standard model is typically ascribed to Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). A handy statement of
this `basic tax competition model' and its main results is provided in Baldwin and Krugman (2004). See
Wilson (1999) for a survey.
2The `new economic geography' was launched with the seminal papers by Krugman (1991), Krugman
and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996). It is surveyed in Baldwin et al. (2003), Fujita et al. (1999),
Fujita and Thisse (2002), Ottaviano and Thisse (2003) and Neary (2001).
3See Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind et al. (2000), Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and
Krugman (2004) and Baldwin et al. (2003).
1equilibria are either those where industry is divided symmetrically or where all of industry
locates in one of two countries. This feature is arguably extreme and not very realistic (see,
e.g., Ottaviano and Thisse, 2003). By focusing on the standard core-periphery model or on
very close descendants, the previous literature has left out an important class of locational
equilibria. Ludema and Wooton who have themselves contributed to the development of
models containing stable equilibria with partial agglomeration (Ludema and Wooton, 1999,
are fully aware of this omission). However, they note that an analysis of such cases would
become complex and therefore abstain from analysing this case in their tax competition
paper (Ludema and Wooton, 1999, 342).
To make the problem tractable, the present paper makes a few strategic simpli¯cations.
First, we use a simple model out of the class of models which feature stable partial ag-
glomeration equilibria (P°Ä uger, 2004). Second, we follow Ludema and Wooton (2000) by
considering head taxes only. Third, to sharpen the tax game, we follow the standard tax
competition literature in assuming that taxes are levied on the mobile factor only (Zodrow
and Mieszkowski, 1986).4 Fourth, we adopt the reduced-form government objective func-
tion of Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and stick to their simple quadratic approximation of
this objective function.
All these simpli¯cations notwithstanding, we have to rely on numerical analyses at
some stages of our analysis. However, our reconsideration of the tax game yields the
results that the tax shield provided by agglomeration forces is more general than suggested
in the previous literature. In particular, we show that a tax di®erential (which increases
with falling trade costs) may arise as an equilibrium of the tax game even when there is
only partial agglomeration and the mobile factor does not derive an agglomeration rent.
This reinforces the plausibility of the hypothesis that agglomeration forces account for
observed (corporate) tax di®erentials in integrating regions such as the European Union
(see Baldwin and Krugman, 2004).
The clue to the existence of equilibria with partial agglomeration lies in the fact that
they are obtained in models which enrich the standard CP model by incorporating further
centrifugal forces or by weakening centripetal forces (P°Ä uger, 2004; Ottaviano and Thisse,
2003). Helpman (1998) incorporates housing (a non-traded good) in the model. At low
4For an analysis of the tax structure in standard tax competition models, see, e.g., Bucovetsky and
Wilson (1991) and Borck (2003). See also Andersson and Forslid (2003) for a discussion of tax structure
in a new economic geography setting.
2trade costs housing rents act as a force which disperses the mobile factor. Fujita et al.
(1999, ch. 18) introduce congestion costs in a general way, and obtain a result similar
to Helpman. Puga (1999) and Fujita et al. (1999, ch. 14) allow for decreasing rather
than constant returns to labour in the production of the agricultural good. Under this
assumption, the manufacturing sector does not face a horizontal labour supply curve as
in the standard CP-model but rather an upward sloping curve which acts as a force of
dispersion. Ludema and Wooton (1999) assume limited factor mobility. If the mobile
factor does not necessarily move in response to any (even marginal) utility di®erential, and
if the mobile population has mobility costs which increase in the distance from the mean,
stable equilibria with partial agglomeration obtain at low trade costs. Another route to
obtain such equilibria is by changing the upper-tier utility function (P°Ä uger, 2004). If the
standard Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility is replaced by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility
function, the demand and supply linkages of the CP-model are retained. However, the
removal of income e®ects weakens the demand linkage and again allows equilibria with
partial agglomeration to be stable. We use this model in our analysis of tax competition
with agglomeration forces. It should be noted that all of these modi¯cations of the CP
model retain equilibria with full agglomeration for certain ranges of trade costs.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section
3 characterises its three types of stable equilibria without taxes (the `no-tax equilibria').
Section 4 introduces the reduced-form government objective function and discusses the
nature of equilibria with head taxes. The tax game is taken up in the two subsequent
subsections. We begin by analysing tax competition in the case of a core-periphery setting.
We then undertake an analysis of the tax game when partial agglomeration is a stable
locational equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Our theoretical analysis draws on P°Ä uger (2004), who develops a model which gives rise
to stable equilibria with partial agglomeration of ¯rms. The model deviates from the
standard core-periphery model in two respects. First, as in Forslid (1999) and Forslid and
Ottaviano (2003), it is assumed that the ¯xed cost in the manufacturing sector consists of
a separate internationally mobile factor. This makes the core-periphery model analytically
solvable without changing its basic features. Second, the Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility is
3replaced by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility speci¯cation. By removing income e®ects from
the manufacturing sector, and hence weakening the demand linkage of the CP model, this
second modi¯cation allows for stable asymmetric equilibria with only partial agglomeration
of ¯rms.5
The world is composed of two countries, home and foreign (denoted by an asterisk (*)),
two factors of production, labor (L) and entrepreneurs (K), and two sectors, manufactur-
ing (X) and agriculture (A). Labor is intersectorally mobile. Countries are assumed to
have identical preferences, technology and trade costs. Entrepreneurs are mobile interna-
tionally in the long run, while labor is assumed to be internationally immobile throughout
the analysis. The agricultural good is homogeneous, traded without costs and produced
perfectly competitively under constant returns with labor as the only input. This good is
the num¶ eraire and assumed to be produced in both countries after trade. The monopolis-
tically competitive X sector employs both factors to produce di®erentiated goods with a
linear cost function. Labor is the only variable input. Entrepreneurs enter only the ¯xed
cost. One entrepreneur is needed (for R&D or headquarter services) to produce at all.
Trade in X is inhibited by iceberg costs.
There are L + K households, L laborers and K entrepreneurs each of whom supplies
one unit of their factor endowment. The two types of households are indexed by h = L;K
and their preferences are assumed to be characterised by:



















; ® > 0; ¾ > 1 (1)
where CX is the manufacturing aggregate and CA is the consumption of the agricultural
good. The quantity consumed of a domestic variety i (foreign variety j) is denoted by xi
(xj). N and N¤ are the number of varieties produced in home and foreign and ¾ is the
elasticity of substitution between any two manufacturing varieties. The budget constraint
of households is given by
















; ¿ > 1 (2)
where Yh denotes the household's pretax income, P is the perfect CES-price index, Pi
(Pj) is the price set by a domestic (foreign) ¯rm. Iceberg trade costs are formalised by the
5This is explained in detail in P°Ä uger (2004).
4constant ¿. These imply that only 1=¿ of a unit of a foreign variety arrives for consumption
and that the consumer price of an imported variety is ¿Pj. Utility maximisation yields the
demand functions and indirect utility, Vh:6
CX = ®P
¡1; CA = Yh ¡ ®; xi = ®P
¡¾
i P
¾¡1; xj = ®(¿Pj)
¡¾P
¾¡1 (3)
Vh = ¡®lnP + Yh + ®(ln® ¡ 1): (4)
The government collects head taxes t from the mobile factor. With the before-tax com-
pensation of laborers and entrepreneurs denoted by W and R respectively, their incomes
are given by YL = W and YK = R ¡ t. The government tax revenue is accordingly given
by
G = tK (5)
Choosing units and letting LA denote labour input, the production function of the agricul-
tural good is XA = LA. Perfect competition ensures that this good is priced at marginal
(which is also average) cost. Since this good is the num¶ eraire, the wage rate is unity,
W = 1.
Market clearing for domestic variety i is expressed by Xi = (L + K)xi+(L¤ + K¤)¿x¤
i,
where Xi is production and x¤
i is the demand of the foreign representative household. Part
of demand is indirect, caused by transport losses. Each product type is supplied by a single
¯rm. With W = 1 and the technology Li = cXi (c > 0, a constant), the marginal cost is
given by c. The ¯xed cost due to the requirement of one unit of human capital is given by
R, since each ¯rm employs exactly one entrepreneur. Let the producer prices charged to
domestic (foreign) households be denoted Pi (P ¤
i ). Pro¯ts of the representative ¯rm in the
home region, ¦i, are then given by:






i ¡ R (6)
With the Chamberlinian large group assumption, pro¯t maximising prices are constant
markups on marginal costs:
Pi = P
¤
i = c¾=(¾ ¡ 1) (7)
The compensation of human capital, R, adjusts so as to ensure zero pro¯t equilibrium.
Using the market clearing condition, a relationship between ¯rm scale Xi and R obtains:
xi = R(¾ ¡ 1)=c: (8)
6We assume that ® < Yh in order to assure that both types of goods are consumed.
53 No-tax equilibria
This section characterises the equilibria in the model without taxes, i.e. where t = t¤ =
0. The long-run location decision of entrepreneurs is governed by the (indirect) utility
di®erential VK ¡ V ¤
K = ®ln(P ¤=P) + (R ¡ R¤) which arises for a given allocation of the
capital stock in the short run.7 Let KW ´ K + K¤ denote the number of entrepreneurs
in the two regions and, hence, ¸ ´ K=KW express the share of ¯rms in the domestic
country. With free trade in goods, using (2), (3), (5), (7) and their foreign analogues, and
imposing symmetry among domestic (and foreign) ¯rms, the zero pro¯t conditions for the
representative ¯rms in home and foreign are given by
¾R =
®(½ + ¸)
¸ + Á(1 ¡ ¸)
+
Á®(½¤ + 1 ¡ ¸)




¸ + Á(1 ¡ ¸)
+
®(½¤ + 1 ¡ ¸)
Á¸ + 1 ¡ ¸
(9)
where Á ´ ¿1¡¾ 2 [0;1], and where ½ ´ L=KW and ½¤ ´ L¤=KW indicate the weight of the
immobile factor in the two economies, respectively. The rates of return on entrepreneurial
capital in both countries in a short-run equilibrium, R and R¤, follow immediately from
(9). The domestic and foreign price levels are obtained from (2), (7) and their foreign
counterparts and from making use of our notational conventions. The utility di®erential is
thus obtained analytically for general trade costs in this model as8
VK ¡ V
¤






¸Á + (1 ¡ ¸)







¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)Á
¡
½ ¤ +(1 ¡ ¸)
¸Á + (1 ¡ ¸)
¸
:
A long-run equilibrium in which both regions produce manufactures is given when
VK ¡ V ¤
K = 0. It can easily be veri¯ed that with identical countries ¸ = 1=2 is always
such an equilibrium. However, because the model contains two agglomerative forces, this
equilibrium is not necessarily stable or unique. There is a supply linkage as the region
with the higher share of entrepreneurs has a larger manufacturing sector and therefore
a lower price index. This is captured in the ¯rst term on the right-hand side of (10).
There is also a demand linkage since increasing the share of entrepreneurs in one region
implies a larger market. This raises the pro¯tability of ¯rms as expressed by the di®erential
(R ¡ R¤) and thus attracts more entrepreneurs. The demand linkage is captured in the
7We follow much of the literature in assuming a myopic adjustment mechanism. A rationalization of
this procedure has been provided by Baldwin (2001). For an extended discussion, see Baldwin et al. (2003).
8Further details of the equilibrium are provided in Appendix A.
6second term on the right-hand side of (10). A stabilising e®ect in the model derives from
the fact that, shifting ¯rms from the foreign to the domestic economy increases competition
among ¯rms for given expenditures on domestic products while lowering competition in
the foreign market, thereby reducing the pro¯tability of the domestic market in relation
to the foreign market. This local competition e®ect is a deglomerative force. Trade costs
a®ect the balance between the two types of forces. When they are large enough, they
render the symmetric equilibrium stable. However, when trade costs are continuously
reduced, the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable. Then two stable and increasingly
asymmetric equilibria emerge in which a larger part (and, ¯nally, all) of the di®erentiated
goods industry is located in one or the other country.
With identical countries and normalising the endowments of factors such that ½ = ½¤ =
1, the bifurcation point ¿b, i.e. the level of trade costs at which asymmetric equilibria
emerge, is given by Áb ´ ¿
1¡¾
b = (¾ ¡ 2)=(5¾ ¡ 4) (see the Appendix). In order to ensure
that Áb > 0, we assume ¾ > 2. Although it is not possible to explicitly derive the level
of trade costs, ¿f, at which full agglomeration in one of the two countries obtains in this
model, an implicit condition can be obtained by setting the utility di®erential (10) equal to








=¾. For ¾ > 1,
this equation has a unique solution in ¿f.
The model exhibits a smooth 'supercritical pitchfork bifurcation'. This is illustrated
in Fig. 2{ 5 which depict the utility di®erential (10) for di®erent levels of trade costs and
for the parameter values ¾ = 6 and ® = 0:3. The corresponding bifurcation diagram is
provided in Fig. 1. In our benchmark case, we ¯nd ¿b = 1:454, and ¿f = 1:337. Figs. 3 and
4 show that an agglomeration rent ­C accrues to mobile entrepreneurs in a core periphery
equilibrium. This is the positive di®erential VK ¡ V ¤
K which obtains for low trade costs at
¸ = 1. An analytic expression of this agglomeration rent is provided in equation (A.3) in
the appendix. Clearly, no such agglomeration rent obtains at intermediate equilibria since
these are characterised by a utility di®erential of zero.
[Figs. 1 and 2, 3, 4, 5 about here]
74 Taxes and tax competition
4.1 Taxes and the government objective function
We now turn to the analysis of taxes and tax competition. For simplicity we normalise the
endowments of factors such that K = K¤ = 1, and hence, KW = 2, and ½ = ½¤ = 1. Under
these assumptions, the international utility di®erential of the mobile factor is given by
VK ¡ V
¤
K = ­(¸;¢) ¡ (t ¡ t
¤) (11)
where ­(¸;¢) is as de¯ned in (10).
Note that ­(¸;¢) does not depend on tax rates. Hence, equilibria can be studied by
superimposing ­(¸;¢) with the tax di®erential t¡t¤. For the case of partial agglomeration,
this is depicted in Fig. 6. The ¯gure shows that there may in general be multiple stable
equilibria, for instance, in the situation shown, there are two stable equilibria, one at A
where home is the partial core and one at B where foreign is the partial core. To deal with
this multiplicity issue, we will assume that one of the countries is originally the core (or
the partial core), and the mobile factor owners cannot coordinate on moving to the other
country; hence, the core region will remain the core as long as this is an equilibrium.
[Fig. 6 about here.]
To endogenise tax rates we adopt the simple reduced form government objective func-
tion of Baldwin and Krugman (2004) in its quadratic form:9
W = G ¡
t2
2
; where G = 2t¸: (12)
Tax proceeds (G) enter the objective function linearly and taxes (t) are assumed to
involve a quadratic loss. Since this paper is not concerned with political economy issues,
this objective function is chosen on the grounds that it renders the analysis simple and
tractable. Moreover as explained in detail in Baldwin and Krugman (2004, 13 f.), this
objective function can be thought of as a reduced form function representing either a
government which acts benevolently (i.e. it cares for the tax proceeds in order to provide
public goods which raise consumers welfare) or a `Leviathan' government (i.e. one which
9The foreign government's objective function is analogous.
8maximises the size of the state or its own utility). It should be noted, though, that this
objective function implies that governments care about agglomeration only insofar as the
tax base is concerned. Other agglomeration bene¯ts, in particular, the lower consumer
price index, are not taken into account by the government.
We now turn to the analysis of tax competition in this model. Three cases have to be
considered, ¯rst the dispersed equilibrium, second the CP outcome with full agglomeration,
and third, the equilibrium with partial agglomeration. Note that these equilibria refer to
the no-tax scenario, and it remains to be shown whether tax competition may change the
outcome, say, from full to partial agglomeration.
In the ¯rst case, trade costs are so high that the only stable equilibrium is one where
an equal proportion of ¯rms locates in both countries. This case is, however, analogous to
the basic tax competition model, since any small tax di®erential leads to a small relocation
of the mobile factor. Therefore, we follow Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and turn directly
to equilibria with industry agglomerated in one country.
4.2 The tax game around core-periphery equilibria
In this section we assume that trade costs are so low that industrial activity is already
completely agglomerated in the domestic economy { the cases depicted in ¯gs. 3 and 4.
We follow Baldwin and Krugman (2004) in modelling the choice of taxes as a three-stage
game: in the ¯rst step, the domestic government (the core) chooses t, in the second step the
foreign government (the periphery) chooses t¤ and in the third step, the market allocation
is realised as described in the last sections. As in the analysis of Baldwin and Krugman
(2004), the resulting Nash equilibrium of a tax game is a subgame perfect equilibrium, or,
in their parlance, a limit-tax Stackelberg-type equilibrium.
The bifurcation type encountered in the present model, a supercritical pitchfork bifur-
cation, complicates the analysis of the tax game around a core-periphery equilibrium as
compared to the analysis in Baldwin and Krugman (2004). Intuitively speaking, with a
supercritical pitchfork bifurcation, the utility di®erential (eq. (10) in our model) goes from
convex to concave as the share of the mobile factor (¸) rises from below to above one half.
This is illustrated by Figs. 2{5. The model used by Baldwin and Krugman, on the other
hand, exhibits a subcritical pitchfork involving agglomeration forces such that the utility
9di®erential goes from concave to convex as ¸ rises from below to above one half.10 The
crucial di®erence between the two cases is, that, for low trade costs, the utility di®erential
always achieves its maximum at ¸ = 1 in what we shall call the `Baldwin-Krugman case',
whereas it may achieve its maximum below values of ¸ = 1 in the present model. This is
illustrated by ¯g. 4. To clarify the implications for the tax game, we divide the following
analysis into two subsections, one which follows the case of Baldwin and Krugman (2004)
and one which takes up the general case.
4.2.1 The Baldwin-Krugman case
We begin by assuming that trade costs are so low that the utility di®erential ­ achieves
its maximum at ¸ = 1, i.e. the case depicted in ¯g. 3. In choosing its tax rate t, the
domestic government is aware of the fact that the foreign government is able to choose a
`delocation' tax rate t¤
d just so low, that, for a given domestic tax rate t the tax di®erential
exceeds the agglomeration rent, i.e. that
­
C · t ¡ t
¤
d; (13)
so that the manufacturing industry would delocate to the foreign economy. By choosing its
own tax rate low enough, the domestic government may act like a limit pricing monopolist
and make it unattractive for the foreign country to choose t¤
d. Let the domestic tax rate
which ensures that the foreign government cannot increase its welfare by choosing the
delocation tax rate be denoted t = te. If the domestic government chooses this tax rate,
it will be in the best interest of the foreign government to accept that it is the periphery.
Hence, the foreign government will choose its unconstrained tax rate t¤
u which maximises the
foreign government objective, taken the domestic tax rate and the fact that the domestic


















u = 0 (15)
10This is elaborated on in Puga (1999, 324) and in P°Ä uger (2004). See Fujita et al. (1999) for an
accessible introduction to these bifurcations and Grandmont (1988) for a technical treatment.
10If, on the other hand, the foreign government chooses t¤















Hence, by equating the welfare levels W ¤
u from (15) with W ¤
d from (16), one obtains:
t
¤
d = 0: (17)
Using te and t¤
d in (13) and solving with equality, the limit tax rate chosen by the domestic
government te is then given by:
te = ­
C: (18)
It remains to be checked that the core's unconstrained tax rate is not lower than te.
Maximising (12) with respect to t, using ¸ = 1, yields an unconstrained tax rate of 2.
Therefore, as long as te < 2, the tax equilibrium is given by the domestic government
choosing te and the foreign government choosing t¤
u. In our numerical simulations, the
condition te < 2 is always ful¯lled.
Since the delocation tax rate and the unconstrained tax rate of the foreign government
coincide, the domestic government is able to fully exploit the agglomeration rent. This
di®erence compared to the result obtained in Baldwin and Krugman (2004) is due to the
fact that, in the present analysis, taxes are levied on the mobile factor only. This sets a
°oor of zero for the delocation tax rate. However, the qualitative behaviour of the tax
di®erential is the same as in Baldwin and Krugman, namely a bell-shaped curve as trade
costs fall. This is illustrated in Fig. 7.11 In our model, this bell-shaped behaviour mimics
the evolution of the agglomeration rent as trade costs fall.
[Figs. 7 and 8 about here.]
4.2.2 The general case
Now we turn to the general case which allows for the possibility that the utility di®erential
(10) achieves its maximum at a level ¸ · 1. A case where ¸ < 1 is illustrated in Fig. 4
where the maximum utility di®erential is indicated by ­M at ¸M.12 Suppose now that we
11Note that the ¯gure contains the `general' case presented in the next section as well.
12The values of ­M and ¸M can be easily derived analytically, but the expressions are rather messy and
therefore omitted here.
11are in the core-periphery equilibrium. In contrast to the Baldwin-Krugman case, a tax
di®erential exceeding the agglomeration rent ­C will now only involve a discrete relocation
to the foreign country if the tax di®erential just exceeds ­M. In this case, all industry
would move to the foreign country. For the domestic government this opens the possibility
that its welfare may be increased by trading o® a small tax di®erential in excess of the
agglomeration rent with a partial loss of ¯rms. This, however, implies that in determining
the equilibrium of the tax game we cannot impose ¸ = 1, contrary to the Baldwin-Krugman
case. Rather, the equilibrium of the tax game will determine the domestic and the foreign
tax rate and the shares of entrepreneurs in the two countries simultaneously.
The determination of this equilibrium gets more involved than in the Baldwin-Krugman
case. However, the fundamental limit-tax reasoning can still be applied. In particular, the
foreign government should not be able to increase its welfare by choosing a delocation






















=2 = [­(¸) ¡ te]2(1 ¡ ¸) ¡ [­(¸) ¡ te]
2 =2;
use having been made of ¸ = 0 on the LHS of (19). If the domestic government chooses
its limit tax te in the ¯rst step, it will not be in the best interest of the foreign government
to choose its delocation tax rate. Rather, it is then in the best interest of the foreign
government to determine its optimal tax rate , t¤









The optimal tax rate is found from the ¯rst order condition:
dW ¤
dt¤ = 2(1 ¡ ¸) ¡ 2t
¤¸t¤ ¡ t













Eqs. (19) and (20) are a system of equations which can be simultaneously solved ¯rst
for te and ¸ and then for t¤
p, and, hence, the tax di®erential. Again, we have to check that
the home government cannot increase its utility by setting a tax rate lower than te, which
is always satis¯ed in our simulations.
12All simpli¯cations of the model notwithstanding, it is not possible to obtain closed-
form solutions. Therefore, we have to turn to numerical simulations to illustrate the tax
equilibrium. We use the parameter values ® = 0:3;¾ = 6. We then ¯nd the level of trade
costs at which ¸M = 1, so that for lower trade costs we are in the B-K case and for higher
costs in the `general case'. This gives a level of trade costs, ~ ¿ = 1:28. Solving for the
equilibrium tax rates produces the equilibrium tax gap shown in Fig. 7. The fraction of
the mobile factor in the home country is shown as a function of trade costs in ¯g. 8.
4.3 The tax game around stable locational equilibria with partial
agglomeration
Given our characterisation of the tax equilibrium for the general case in the previous section
it is now easy to characterise the tax game around stable location equilibria with partial
agglomeration, say in the domestic country, a case depicted by point A in ¯g. 5.
We continue to model the tax game as a sequential Stackelberg game. It might appear
more natural to model this game as a simultaneous Cournot-Nash game as employed in the
`basic tax competition model'. However, it turns out that, in general, pure strategy Nash
equilibria do not exist in this game (see Appendix B for details). Moreover, the use of
the Stackelberg game makes our paper more easily comparable to Baldwin and Krugman
(2004).
The determination of the equilibrium tax rates involves the same reasoning as previ-
ously, where the choice of the delocation tax rate by the foreign government will not involve
a shift of all industry to the foreign country but a shift that is limited to a locational equi-
librium such as B (with corresponding ¸B) in ¯g. 5. With this modi¯cation, the system
of equations determining the two tax rates and the equilibrium share of entrepreneurs in







































As before, we have to check that the home government's optimal tax rate is not lower
than te, which is always satis¯ed in our simulations.
13Again we have to rely on numerical simulations to obtain solutions for the equilibrium
tax rates and the equilibrium allocation of entrepreneurs between the two countries. We
then numerically solve the game as just described. The resulting tax di®erential, te¡t¤ (te),
is shown as function of trade costs in ¯g. 9. The ¯gure shows that as trade costs increase,
over the range where partial agglomeration is stable, the tax di®erential falls, and in fact,
for su±ciently large trade costs, the tax di®erential becomes negative. This concurs with
intuition in the sense that lowering trade costs increases agglomeration forces and therefore
provides a higher shield to the partial core country. As shown in ¯g. 10, the share of the
mobile factor in the partial core decreases with trade costs as well. It is also easily seen
that for Á = Áb, the equilibrium converges to the Stackelberg equilibrium presented in the
previous subsection. The tax gap over the range of trade costs ¿ 2 [1;¿b], is shown in Fig.
11.
[Figs. 9, 10 and 11 about here.]
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have reconsidered the analysis of tax competition under agglomeration
forces. Whereas the previous literature has considered either symmetric equilibria or loca-
tion equilibria with complete agglomeration, we have presented a model which also allows
for partial agglomeration. We have shown that in the case with partial agglomeration, the
partial core can maintain a positive tax gap even though no agglomeration rent accrues
to the mobile factor. An interesting di®erence to Baldwin and Krugman's analysis is that
with our speci¯cation, the equilibrium for the core-periphery outcome has to be modi¯ed.
In particular, it may be that over some range, partial agglomeration is the outcome of
the tax game even though complete agglomeration is the only stable equilibrium without
taxes.
To sum up, in a model with agglomeration forces, at very high trade costs, factor
mobility implies that tax competition has much the same °avour as in the standard model.
The main di®erence between our model and that of Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and
others is the case of partial agglomeration in addition to the `extreme' outcome of complete
agglomeration. Our paper has shown that agglomeration forces may provide a tax shield in
less extreme scenarios as well. Thus, the message of Baldwin and Krugman's (2002) paper
14and their interpretation of tax competition in Europe may carry over to the arguably more
realistic scenario of partial agglomeration.
Appendix A
A full characterisation of the model is provided in P°Ä uger (2004). For convenience, we
provide some of its most important features in this appendix.
Equilibrium Once R is derived from (9), the ¯rm scale Xi follows from (8) and the
other endogenous variables can be derived in a straightforward way. The X sector em-
ploys NcXi = NR(¾ ¡ 1) units of labor which we assume to be less than L in order to
ensure that both sectors are active after trade. This implies the parameter restriction
® < ½¾=(2½ + 1)(¾ ¡ 1).
Bifurcation point The bifurcation point, i.e. the level of trade costs at which asym-
metric equilibria with partial agglomeration emerge can be obtained by ¯rst calculating
­¸, the derivative of (10) with respect to ¸, then evaluating this expression around a sym-
metric equilibrium (yielding ­s
¸) and ¯nally by equating the resulting expression to zero
and solving for Á. Using " ´ (1 ¡ Á) gives the following intermediate steps:
­¸ =
®"f"2 [(1 ¡ ¾ + ¸(2 + 3¾" + 4Á)) ¡ ¸2 (2 + 3" + 4Á)] + [(3¾ ¡ 2)Á + Á2 + 2(¾ ¡ 1)Á3]g
(¾ ¡ 1)¾ (1 ¡ ¸")





¸ ´ ­¸j¸=1=2 =
4®(1 ¡ Á)[2 ¡ 4Á + ¾ (5Á ¡ 1)]
(¾ ¡ 1)¾ (1 + Á)
2 : (A.2)
At most ¯ve equilibria Using the techniques of Robert-Nicoud (2003), it can be shown
that the model has at most ¯ve equilibria (including the C-P outcomes). Moreover, it can
be shown that the level of trade costs where the bifurcation fork emerges is higher than
the level where full agglomeration obtains.
No black hole condition As in the CP model we want to rule out that the agglomerative
forces are so strong that the symmetric equilibrium is unstable even at high (in¯nite) trade
15costs (Fujita et al., 1999). In the present model this `no-black-hole-condition' commands:
¾=(¾ ¡ 1) < 2½ or ¾ > 2.
Agglomeration rent The agglomeration rent is the positive di®erential VK ¡V ¤
K which
obtains for low trade costs from (10) evaluate at ¸ = 1:
­

















In a situation where stable interior equilibria exist, one might think that a more natural
way to model the tax game would be a simultaneous Cournot-Nash game as employed in
the `basic tax competition model'. However, it turns out that in general, a simultaneous
Nash equilibrium may not exist. To see this, consider Fig. B.1, where we have plotted
reaction functions for home and foreign, denoted by r and r¤, for ¿ = 1:35 (that is, a level
of trade costs where in the absence of taxes there are equilibria with partial agglomeratio).
As can be seen in the ¯gure, for low home tax rates, foreign chooses tax rate, say, ^ t¤, which
maximises its welfare, conditional on being the partial core. The reason is that in this range,
undercutting in order to attract the core would lead to lower welfare since the delocation
tax rate is too low. However, above some ~ t, foreign can pro¯tably set its delocation tax
rate and attract the core. Hence, the kink in the foreign reaction function. Since the home
reaction function does not intersect the foreign reaction function, no equilibrium in pure
strategies exists. Hence, we use the Stackelberg game, both to make our paper more easily
comparable to Baldwin and Krugman (2004), and to circumvent the problem of equilibrium
existence.
[Fig. B.1 about here.]
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Figure 1: Bifurcation diagram







Figure 2: Dispersed equilibrium









Figure 3: Full agglomeration (Baldwin-Krugman case)



















Figure 5: Partial agglomeration






















Figure 7: Equilibrium tax gap in the CP outcome







Figure 8: Allocation of mobile factor in the \general CP" outcome






Figure 9: Equilibrium tax gap in the \partial agglomeration" outcome






























Figure B.1: Non existence of Nash equilibrium in the \partial agglomeration" outcome.
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